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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Joseph G. Chumlea* and Michael Curry**
I. USURY AND THE CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
HE reported cases during the 1985 Survey period included several
important usury opinions as well as a handful of Texas Consumer
Credit Code' (Credit Code) cases. Usury issues included: the com-
mon law usury action; whether a pleading in a lawsuit constitutes the requi-
site "charging" for a usury action or defense; the bona fide error defense; an
examination of the types of transactions to which the usury statutes are ap-
plicable; and other substantive and procedural issues. Credit Code cases
dealt with prohibited terms in motor vehicle installment contracts, the inter-
est free period in an installment contract for home improvements, the Credit
Code as an additional remedy to the Deceptive Trade Practices Act,2 and
other related issues.
A. Usury
The Amarillo court of appeals breathed new life into the little-known
common law action for usury. In Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. v.
West 3 the Amarillo court recognized the common law action for recovery of
all interest paid upon a finding of usurious conduct under article 1.06(1) of
the Credit Code.4 This remedy represents a significant and additional tool
for the plaintiffs attorney, especially in transactions that involve front-end
loaded interest, such as real estate loans. The findings in West did not in-
clude a violation of article 1.06(2), which requires a forfeiture of all interest
and principal upon proof of an interest charge in excess of double the legal
rate. Consequently, a finding of usury under article 1.06(1) and, by analogy,
article 8.01 of the Credit Code,5 permits both the recovery and forfeiture of
* B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., The University of Houston; Attorney at Law,
Phalen, Chumlea & McQuality, Dallas, Texas. Copyright 1986.
** B.A., with honors, The University of Texas; J.D., with honors, The University of
Texas; Attorney at Law, Bragg, Smithers & Curry, Austin, Texas. Copyright 1986.
1. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts 5069-1.01 to -51.19 (Vernon 1971 & Pam. Supp.
1971-86) is commonly referred to as the Texas Consumer Credit Code, and all references
herein, unless otherwise noted, are made thereto.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
3. 677 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971).
5. The transaction in West concerned interest and was, therefore, subject to the penalties
in article 1.06. The usury penalties for charging excess time price differential under articles
8.01 and 8.02 result from the application of the same principle. See Jim Walter Homes v.
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all interest under the contract if the common law action has been properly
pleaded, regardless of the establishment of a violation of article 1.06(2) or its
counterpart in article 8.02.
In a well reasoned historical analysis6 the Amarillo court traced the his-
tory of this common law action to the 1890 holding of the Texas Supreme
Court in Bexar Building & Loan Association v. Robinson.7 The court found
more recent treatment in Ferguson v. Tanner Development Co.,8 First State
Bank of Bedford v. Miller,9 and Flannery v. Bishop. 10 The opinion also scru-
tinized the legislative intent behind article 1.06.11
The holding in West is significant due to the court's refusal to construe the
term "usurious interest" to mean only the excess interest paid above the
authorized maximum rate. Instead, the court allowed recovery of all inter-
est that was paid. 12 The court emphasized that the common law action must
be viewed in light of the present provisions of article 1.06(1), which mandate
a forfeiture of three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for,
charged or received.' 3 As the court observed if the lender was allowed to
retain an amount of interest equal to the legal rate, the lender would actually
benefit from its unlawful action and effectively escape the triple damages
provision of the statute. 14
Two cases dealt with the issue of whether a pleading in a lawsuit consti-
tutes a charging of interest or time price differential for usury purposes. 15 In
Petroscience Corp. v. Diamond Geophysical'6 the lower court had held that
an abandoned pleading for interest was not a "charging" as a matter of
law. 17 The Texas Supreme Court expressly rejected that reasoning but re-
fused the application for writ of error on other grounds.18
In Moore v. White Motor Credit Corp.'9 the Dallas court of appeals af-
firmed a jury finding that a superseded pleading for unearned time price
differential was an actionable charging. The court ruled that the contention
that a pleading cannot constitute a charge of interest within the meaning of
Valencia, 679 S.W.2d 29, 34 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, affid as modified, 690 S.W.2d
239 (Tex. 1985)).
6. 677 S.W.2d at 676-79.
7. 14 S.W. 227 (Tex. 1890).
8. 541 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, rev'd on other grounds,
561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977)).
9. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978). Although not cited in the West opinion, the reasoning in
Wall v. East Texas Teachers Credit Union, 533 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1976), supports the same
conclusion to the extent that it denied a lender the right to offset earned interest against a
usury penalty.
10. 81 Wash. 2d 696, 504 P.2d 778 (1972).
11. 677 S.W.2d at 679.
12. Id. at 680.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Petroscience Corp. v. Diamond Geophysical, 684 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1984) and
Moore v. White Motor Credit Corp., Cause No. 05-84-0032-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, Septem-
ber 16, 1985, no writ).
16. 684 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1984).
17. Id. at 669.
18. Id.
19. Cause No. 05-84-0032-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, September 16, 1985, no writ).
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the Texas usury statutes was without merit.20
The courts in Moore21 and West 22 both addressed the bona fide error de-
fense to usury. In West the defendant asserted a bona fide error defense
under the banner of "ignorance of the law." This argument failed to find
support.23 The Amarillo court noted that the bona fide error defense does
not embrace a person's lack of knowledge of Texas usury law and its applica-
tion to a particular transaction.24 Rather, the defense addresses whether the
parties intended to make the bargain or erred in their calculations.
The opinion in Moore contains a more detailed treatment of the bona fide
error defense. The Moore court ultimately ruled that the filing of a sworn
petition that contains a usurious charge of interest does not prohibit the ap-
plication of the bona fide error defense under article 8.02 of the Credit Code
despite the fact that article 8.02 does not contain such a defense.25 The
court based its reasoning on the holding in Tyra v. Bob Carrol Construction
CO.2 6 In Tyra the supreme court held that articles 1.06(1) and 1.06(2) of the
Credit Code allow the bona fide error defense.27 The Dallas court, by anal-
ogy, found that the same reasoning also-supports the availability of the de-
fense to a claim under article 8.02.28
The bona fide error defense holding in Moore is an oversimplification of
the resemblance of articles 8.01 and 8.02 to articles 1.06(1) and (2). A single
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 677 S.W.2d 668.
23. Id. at 677.
24. Id.
25. Moore, slip op. at 16.
26. 639 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1982).
27. Id. at 690. Articles 5069-1.06(1) and (2) read in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is greater
than the amount authorized by this Subtitle, shall forfeit to the obligor
three times the amount of usurious interest contracted for, charged or re-
ceived, such usurious interest being the amount the total interest con-
tracted for, charged or received exceeds the amount of interest allowed by
law, and reasonable attorney fees fixed by the court except that in no event
shall the amount forfeited be less than Two Thousand Dollars or twenty
percent or principal, whichever is the smaller sum; provided, that there
shall be no penalty for any usurious interest which results from an acciden-
tal and bona fide error.
(2) Any person who contracts for, charges or receives interest which is in ex-
cess of double the amount of interest allowed by this Subtitle shall forfeit as
an additional penalty, all principal as well as interest and all other charges
and shall pay reasonable attorney fees set by the court ....
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) and (2) (Vernon 1971). The Texas Supreme
Court also held that the bona fide error defense was applicable to both 1.06(1) and (2). See
Tri-County Farmer's Co-Op v. Bendele, 641 S.W.2d 208, 209 n.4 (Tex. 1982) (citing Tyra, 639
S.W.2d 690). Esparza v. Nolan Wells Communications, Inc., 653 S.W.2d 532 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1983, no writ) discussed the problem of ignorance and compared and distinguished
Tyra on the facts. The Esparza court observed that in Tyra the attorney was unaware that the
petition signed and filed by him contained a claim for interest that his creditor-client had not
previously asserted. Id. at 536. In Esparza, however, the evidence showed no similar mistake,
but rather suggested that the creditor's actions (i.e. not the creditor's intent to charge interest,
but instead its acts in sending notices and statements charging interest) were intentional,
although perhaps taken in ignorance of the usury laws. Id.
28. Moore, slip op. at 8.
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article, labelled "Penalties," contains both articles 1.06(1) and (2). Subpart
(1) prohibits penalties for usurious interest that results from an accidental
and bona fide error.29 Subpart (2) provides more severe penalties under the
same article when there is an overcharge in excess of double the lawful maxi-
mum rate.30 By contrast, article 8.01 is a more detailed treatment of the
respective rights of the creditor and debtor in the event of usury. Not only is
the penalty provision in article 8.01(1) different from its counterpart in arti-
cle 1.06(1), but under article 8.01 the creditor is also given several opportu-
nities to cure usurious conduct without incurring liability for penalties. 31
No similar "escape valve" exists under article 1.06. The cure provisions in
article 8.01 allow both bona fide mistakes and intentional acts to go
unpunished.
The most notable distinction between the statutes, however, is in the lan-
guage creating the bona fide error defense in article 8.01.32 The statute's
intent seems clear in its grant of clemency for unintentional and bona fide
errors only to those actions brought under 8.01. Article 8.02 does not men-
tion a similar defense. Although the Moore opinion questioned the reasona-
bleness of fashioning a stricter penalty under 8.02 than the penalty that is
available under 1.06, this reasoning failed to consider the cure provisions
under 8.01 and their salutary effect and the absence of similar provisions in
1.06.
Another Dallas court of appeals decision examined the application of arti-
cle 1.03 of the Credit Code to a stated account. In Griffith v. Geffen & Ja-
cobsen33 a law firm sued a former client upon a written agreement dated
August 11, 1981, that included a repayment schedule ending on October 5,
1981. The law firm filed suit in April, 1982, for default on the agreement
and sought prejudgment interest at six percent per annum from October 21,
1981. The client raised the defense of usury for excessive interest under arti-
cle 1.03. The court of appeals sanctioned the interest charge and, under the
rationale of the 1887 supreme court opinion in Heidenheimer v. Ellis,3 4 ruled
that article 1.03 did not apply to this stated account. 35 The court thus held
that the firm could recover prejudgment interest from August 11, 1981, the
date of the agreement. 36
29. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1971).
30. Id. art. 5069-1.06(2).
31. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(c)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Vernon 1971).
32. Article 8.01(0 states that:
A person may not be held liable in any action brought under this Article for a
violation of this Subtitle or of Chapter 14 of this Title if such person shows by a
preponderance of evidence that (1) the violation was not intentional and resulted
from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reason-
ably adopted to avoid such violation or that (2) the violation was an act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with any rule, regulation, or interpretation
of this Title by any state agency, board, or commission ....
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.01(f) (Vernon 1971).
33. 693 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
34. 67 Tex. 426, 3 S.W. 666 (1887).
35. 695 S.W.2d at 726-27.
36. Id.
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The court's reasoning in Griffith is flawed. In Heidenheimer the Texas
supreme court interpreted the predecessor statute of article 1.03, which ap-
plied only to written contracts ascertaining the sum payable or to open ac-
counts. 37  Since a "stated account," as opposed to an "open account,"
formed the basis of the claim in Heidenheimer, the court held that the statu-
tory time periods were inapplicable and allowed pre-judgment interest from
the date of acknowledgment and promise to pay.38 The Heidenheimer hold-
ing controlled until the 1979 Legislature amended article 1.03 and made it
applicable to "all accounts and contracts ascertaining the sum payable."
39
The additional language, "all accounts," clearly embraces stated accounts
and open accounts and should include the account sued upon in Griffith.
The real issue in Griffith should have been the determination of when the
sum became due and payable. 4° Pre-judgment interest under the new ver-
sion of article 1.03 is allowable only upon the thirtieth day from and after
the date when the sum is due and payable. The court might well have found
that in a stated account the sum is due and payable upon acknowledgment.
Consequently, pre-judgment interest could have been charged beginning
September 10, 1981. This interpretation would not have changed the result
reached in Griffith. The holding in Griffith that article 1.03 does not apply
to a stated account,4 1 however, is contrary to the clear language of the stat-
ute as it presently reads.
A number of courts during the Survey period had the opportunity to ad-
dress the availability of a usury claim to a guarantor of an obligation. The
courts in Greenway Bank & Trust v. Smith,42 Allied Supplier & Erection v. A.
Baldwin & Company,43 and Moore v. White Motor Credit Corp." each held
that a guarantor could not assert a usury claim or defense. Both Greenway
Bank & Trust and Moore base their holdings on the Texas Supreme Court's
ruling in Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner.
4 5
In Houston Sash & Door the court ruled that the usury defense is personal
to the debtor and that the penalty forfeitures in article 1.06 apply only to the
"immediate parties to the transaction creating the usury defense."'46 The
court also held that a guaranty only falls with an underlying obligation when
the obligation is void for illegality. 47 Consequently, the court in Houston
Sash & Door denied a usury defense to a guarantor unless: (1) the guarantor
was an "immediate party to the transaction creating the usury defense;" or
(2) the underlying obligation was void for illegality.
The factual applications of the first exception appear to be limited to only
37. TEX. CIv. STAT. arts. 2976-77 (1879) (repealed 1968).
38. 3 S.W. at 666.
39. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1968).
40. 693 S.W.2d at 727.
41. Id.
42. 679 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
43. 688 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
44. Cause No. 05-84-00032-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, September 16, 1985, no writ).
45. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).




a few situations. Examples include when a partner executes a usurious note
on behalf of the partnership so that he becomes personally liable and also
personally guarantees it or when an individual personally guarantees his own
usurious note. Applications of the second exception, however, are not so
remote. Although the second exception apparently was not raised, it would
have applied to Moore. Under this second exception, pursuant to articles
1.06(2) and 8.02, each contract, charge, or receipt for more than twice the
maximum lawful interest or time price differential rate is specifically de-
clared illegal and subjects the violator to a criminal misdemeanor fine. Each
such contract or transaction constitutes a separate offense. Since any con-
tract that is illegal in its formation or performance is void and unenforce-
able,48 a guarantor of any note or charge involving an interest rate at more
than twice the lawful maximum rate should be entitled to at least the defense
of usury. To hold otherwise would permit enforcement of an illegal
transaction.
Several recent cases dealt with the question of when additional charges
constitute interest. In Texas Commerce Bank v. Goldring4 9-the supreme
court examined a bank's requirement that a debtor pay, as part of an agree-
ment to renew a note in default, the bank's attorneys' fees incurred in seek-
ing to foreclose on real estate securing the original note. The court found
that this payment did not constitute interest based upon the holding in
Greever v. Persky50 that a lender may make an extra charge for any distinctly
separate and additional consideration other than the simple lending of
money without violating the usury law. Justice Spears, in a "requiem to
usury," 5' 1 reluctantly concurred with the result, not because it was proper
but because it followed from a line of cases permitting charges far beyond
those addressed in Greever. Justice Spears lamented that the court's action
permitted banks to avoid the usury laws altogether by adding the expense of
doing business to the interest charged on the loans. 52 Justice Spears' concur-
ring opinion and the dissent of Justice Robertson seem directed at the lan-
guage in Greever that excludes from interest only those charges for which the
lender provides any separate consideration other than lending money. 53 As
both justices observed, the bank alone incurred the attorneys' fees charged in
Goldring for the protection of the bank's interest in collateral securing the
original note. The justices contended that the fees could hardly be inter-
preted as a consideration for the debtors.
In Perry v. Stewart Title Co. 54 the Fifth Circuit refused to classify es-
48. Lewis v. Davis, 199 S.W.2d 146, 148-49 (Tex. 1947); Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v.
Tabor, 283 S.W. 779, 780 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, judgmt adopted); 14 TEX. JUR. 3d Con-
tracts § 141 (1981).
49. 665 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1984).
50. 165 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1942).
51. 665 S.W.2d at 106. Justice Spears suggests the tombstone inscription "Requiescat in
pace!," 665 S.W.2d at 106, to which this author would add, de mortuis nihil nisi bonum.
52. Id.
53. 165 S.W.2d at 712.
54. 756 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1985).
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crowed taxes and insurance premiums as interest. 55 The court based its
holding upon the rule that bona fide fees paid to third parties for services are
not characterized as interest.5 6 The court similarly refused to classify legiti-
mate late fees as interest because the payments were not for the use, forbear-
ance, or detention of money, but constituted bona fide fees paid to third
parties for servicing the late payments.57
The characterization of late charges was also discussed in Tygrett v. Uni-
versity Gardens Homeowners Association.58 The opinion defines the three
elements of interest in article 1.01, which are use, forbearance, and detention
of money, and concludes that legitimate late fees do not fall within any ele-
ment.59 Consequently, the court held that the usury laws are inapplicable to
late charges.
Litigants are increasingly attempting to apply the usury statutes beyond
customary loans or use of money situations. The severity of the penalties
and the prospect for recovering attorneys' fees fuels these efforts, as exempli-
fied in Jim Walter Homes v. Valencia,60 which follows in the discussion on
the Consumer Credit Code.
In the usury area, two recent cases considered and denied the debtor's
claim for application of the usury laws. Bray v. McNeely6' involved allega-
tions that the purchase of a one-half interest in property for $50,000.00,
which included an option by which the purchaser could require the seller to
repurchase the property for $55,000.00 sixty days later, was in fact a loan.
The jury found that the transaction was an investment and not a loan.62 The
trial court, however, determined otherwise and granted judgment non ob-
stante verdicto, concluding that the loan was usurious as a matter of law. 63
On appeal the court reviewed the jury's finding under the no evidence stan-
dard and reversed the trial court's judgment.64 The appellate court found
that both the testimony and documentary evidence supported the jury's find-
ing that the transaction constituted a sale of an interest in property rather
than a loan. 65
In Wiley-Reiter Corp. v. Groce66 the defaulting parties to a settlement
agreement appealed from a judgment entered after their default. The settle-
ment agreement authorized the appellee to confess a judgment in his favor
for three times the remaining balance owed on the agreement in the event an
installment payment was not timely made. The appellants contended that
55. Id. at 1207.
56. Id.; see Imperial Corp. v. Frenchman's Creek Corp., 453 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.
1972); Tanner Dev. Co. v. Ferguson, 561 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. 1977); Greever, 165 S.W.2d at 711.
57. 756 F.2d at 1207-08.
58. 687 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
59. Id. at 483-84.
60. 679 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, aft'd as modified, 690 S.W.2d 239
(Tex. 1985)); see infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
61. 682 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
62. Id. at 616.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 620.
65. Id. at 618-19.
66. 693 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
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the trial court erroneously entered judgment based upon an agreement that,
as a matter of law, was not only usurious but also allowed interest at a rate
of more than double the legal maximum rate. The court of appeals dis-
agreed because the fundamental element of a usurious transaction was miss-
ing: there was no overcharge for the use, forbearance, or detention of
money.67 The court found neither a credit transaction nor a loan of
money. 68 Consequently, no basis existed for the application of the usury
laws.
Lawler v. Lomas & Nettleton Mortgage Investors69 addressed whether a
new loan is created when a noncorporate borrower on an original note incor-
porates and negotiates a renewal note at corporate rates. Lawler involved
two loans. An unincorporated borrower originally obtained a loan on
March 21, 1972, in the principal sum of $40,000.00 with interest at ten per-
cent per annum, maturing on March 1, 1975. One year later the borrower
incorporated and thereafter executed a new note in January, 1975, for
$479,500.00, due January 20, 1976, with interest at five percent over prime.
A subsequent amendment reduced the rate to ten percent per annum. The
renewal note otherwise permitted eighteen percent interest per annum upon
default. For the first four years, the creditor sent statements that recited ten
percent interest, but calculated per diem interest on the basis of a 360 day
year.
The two issues raised by this loan concerned whether two loans or only
one existed, and whether interest calculations used in the first note were usu-
rious. The court found that the original note and the renewal note executed
by the corporation created two separate obligations. 70 The court observed
the factual differences between the two notes, such as interest rates, methods
of calculating interest, and provisions regarding prepayment.71 The court
also considered several references contained in the renewal note and corre-
sponding deed of trust regarding the fact of payment of the first note. 72 Fi-
nally, the court noted the similarity of its holding in RepublicBank Dallas v.
Shook,73 in which it sanctioned the use of a shell corporation to avoid usury
restrictions when the borrower intended for the loan and the corporation to
further a profit-oriented enterprise. 74
After establishing the existence of two separate notes and approving incor-
poration to avoid application of the usury laws in connection with a profit
enterprise, the court ruled that the original loan was usurious because the
bank had calculated the loan upon a per diem rate based on a 360 day year.75
The subsequent application of this per diem rate to a 365 day calendar year
67. Id. at 703.
68. Id.
69. 691 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985).
70. Id. at 596.
71. Id. at 595-96.
72. Id. at 595.
73. 653 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. 1983).
74. Id. at 281.
75. Id. at 296.
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produced a usurious rate equalling 10.139 percent. If the bank had simply
applied the per diem rate to a 360 day year by treating each month as if it
had only 30 days, it could have avoided the problem.
B. Consumer Credit Code
Several cases scrutinized the boiler plate repossession provision of a stan-
dard form contract used by General Motors Acceptance Corporation. The
cases ultimately found that the provision violated Chapter 7 of the Con-
sumer Credit Code. 76 The Corpus Christi court of appeals ruled on the re-
possession clause in four different opinions. Gonzales v. Gainan's Chevrolet
City,7 7 Hinojosa v. Castellow Chevrolet-Oldsmobile,78 Trevino v. Castellow
Chevrolet-Oldsmobile,79 and an unpublished opinion in Garcia v. Gainan's
Chevrolet City80 all challenged the following contract clause as violating arti-
cle 7.07(3): "Further, in such event [of default] seller or any sheriff or other
officer of the law may take immediate possession of said property without
demand... and for this purpose seller may enter upon the premises where
said property may be and remove same."'' s In each case the court cited the
Dallas court of appeals decision in Martens v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp.,82 which interpreted the identical contract clause, although it was
challenged under a different part of the statute. 83 Since the Dallas court had
passed favorably on the contract clause, and since the Corpus Christi court
considered the reasoning in Martens to be just as sound when applied to the
7.07(3) challenge, 84 the Corpus Christi court ruled in each instance that the
repossession clause did not authorize an unlawful entry or breach of the
peace as proscribed by the statute.85
In reversing the court of appeal's holdings, the supreme court in Gonzales
v. Gainan's Chevrolet City,86 Trevino v. Castellow Chevrolet-Oldsmobile,87
and Garcia v. Gainan's Chevrolet City8 8 specifically declared that the repos-
session clause violated article 7.07(3). The supreme court emphasized its
holding in Southwestern Investment Co. v. Mannix8 9 that the presence of
such a clause in a retail installment contract deceives the very individuals
whom the legislature intended to protect, the uneducated, the poor, and the
76. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.01 to -7.10 (Vernon 1971).
77. 684 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, rev'd, 690 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.
1985)).
78. 678 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
79. 680 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, rev'd, 690 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.
1985)).
80. Garcia was submitted as a companion case to Gonzales; see supra note 77.
81. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-7.07(3) (Vernon 1971).
82. 584 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, no writ).
83. The identical contract clause was challenged in Martens under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069-7.07(4) (Vernon 1971).
84. Hinojosa, 678 S.W.2d at 711.
85. 584 S.W.2d at 944.
86. 690 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex. 1985).
87. 690 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. 1985).
88. 690 S.W.2d 892, 893 (Tex. 1985).
89. 557 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. 1977).
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elderly, into believing that their creditors could, with the law's blessing, for-
cibly enter their homes at any time and remove their goods.90
The supreme court in Gonzales v. Gainan's Chevrolet City9 also an-
nounced a new rule for construing those provisions in contracts that are not
relevant to a determination of usury. The court accepted the rule that con-
tracts that are allegedly usurious based on the fact that they call for collec-
tion of unearned interest should be construed to comply with the law if they
are reasonably susceptible of such an interpretation. 92 The court found,
however, no reason to similarly presume the legality of terms and provisions
of a contract that the Credit Code requires or prohibits and that are irrele-
vant to a finding of usury.93 In doing so the court specifically disapproved a
line of lower court authority holding to the contrary. 94
In Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Valencia95 the Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals considered whether, in connection with a house construction contract
subject to Chapter 6 of the Credit Code, 96 a demand for payment and accel-
eration prior to substantial completion of construction constituted a charg-
ing of time-price differential in excess of twice the lawful maximum. Under
the facts in the case, the court found such a violation.9 7 After observing jury
findings that the house contained numerous defects, failed to satisfy implied
warranties, and would require repair costs amounting to almost one-half of
the original price, the court found an absence of substantial completion
under the contract.9 8 In addressing the time at which one may legally
"charge" under a construction contract, the court ruled that, absent an
agreement to the contrary, an indebtedness does not become due under a
construction contract or a contract for services until the builder substantially
complies. 99 Consequently, the buyers' obligation to begin payments in Va-
lencia had not been triggered, and the demands for payment and accelera-
tion constituted a charging during the interest-free period. Under the
Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner'° ° principle, such a charging automati-
cally exceeded the maximum lawful rate by more than two times.
Finally, in Kish v. Van Note' 0 the supreme court recognized the right of
an aggrieved consumer to recover damages under the Deceptive Trade Prac-
90. 690 S.W.2d at 886.
91. Id. at 884,
92. 690 S.W.2d at 887 (citing Nevels v. Harris, 129 Tex. 190, 102 S.W.2d 1046 (1937);
and Walker v. Temple Trust Co., 124 Tex. 575, 80 S.W.2d 935 (1935)).
93. 690 S.W.2d at 887.
94. Id., disapproving Haley v. Pagen Lewis Motors, Inc., 647 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Grant v. Friendly Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 612
S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
95. 679 S.W.2d 29 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, afl'd as modified, 690 S.W.2d 239
(Tex. 1985)).
96. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01 to -6.09 (Vernon 1971).
97. 679 S.W.2d at 34.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
101. 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tex. 1985).
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tices-Consumer Protection Act. 102 The court also recognized penalties
under the Credit Code where there is proof of violations of both statutes.
The case established the possibility of a treble recovery based on the Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act in addition to the mandatory triple or double usury
penalties 10 3 contained in the Credit Code.
II. ESTABLISHING AND COLLECTING CLAIMS
A. Notes and Other Credit Arrangements
Two cases reported during the Survey period presented the question of the
liability of a business entity for repayment of a loan that is evidenced by a
note signed by an owner in his individual capacity. In Anderson v. Badger' °4
the creditor, Badger, executed a $20,000 check payable to Anderson-Giles
Building Group, a partnership composed of Anderson and Giles. In ex-
change for delivery of the check Badger received two $10,000 promissory
notes: one signed only by Anderson and one signed by Giles and his wife.
The two notes bore different interest rates. The Anderson note was secured
by partnership property, whereas the Giles note was unsecured. Badger
brought suit seeking to hold Anderson liable on the Giles note or, alterna-
tively, on the debt represented by the $20,000 loan.
The court of appeals denied both theories of recovery.' 05 The court first
rejected the creditor's characterization of his suit as containing an alterna-
tive claim on the debt. 106 The court relied upon the parties' stipulation that
the purpose of the case was to collect on the notes,10 7 and held further that
no debt ever existed separate from the notes. 0 8 The court refused to hold
Anderson liable on the note since the note did not bear his signature. 10 9 The
note had been signed by Giles individually without use of the partnership
name; therefore, it was not a partnership debt. 10 The court held that this
result was proper even though Giles had deposited the proceeds in the part-
nership account and used them for partnership business.1 ' The partnership
did not ratify the Giles note since the circumstances indicated that Badger
intended to deal with the partners in their individual capacities and not as
102. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
103. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06, 8.01-8.02 (Vernon 1971).
104. 693 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
105. Id. at 648.
106. Id. at 646-47.
107. Id. at 646.
108. Id. The court cited First State Bank v. Dyer, 151 Tex. 650, 254 S.W.2d 92 (1953) in
support of its holding. In Dyer a bank sought to hold a partnership, which had received and
used the proceeds of a loan, liable on the debt even though it was not liable on a note that a
partner had signed in his individual capacity. The supreme court held that the note was the
original debt and that there was no pre-existing debt separate and apart from the note. Id. at
93. The supreme court also held that the parol evidence rule excluded extraneous evidence
showing any liability for the partnership on the note. Id.
109. 693 S.W.2d at 647. The court cited TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401(a) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968), which provides that "[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his
signature appears thereon."




agents of the partnership. 1 2 The court held that no ratification exists when
the creditor intends to deal not with the principal but with the agents in their
individual capacities. 113
In National Mar-Kit, Inc. v. Forest'1 4 a creditor sought to hold a closely-
held corporation liable for repayment of a $15,000 loan. The creditor had
paid the corporate president in the form of a check. The president deposited
the check in the corporate account, but withdrew the funds and spent them
for his own personal expenses. Approximately six months after the loan, the
creditor requested a promissory note to evidence the loan. The creditor ac-
cepted a note that named the corporate president personally as maker,
although this note was later returned to the corporate president with a cove-
nant not to sue on the note. Ultimately, the creditor brought suit, alleging
that at the request of the corporate president he had made a loan for the
corporation that had not been paid. The trial court rendered judgment in
favor of the lender against the corporate defendant.
On appeal the corporation sought to treat the creditor's suit as one
brought on the note and argued that: (1) since the corporation had not
signed the note, it could not be obligated on the note;1' 5 and (2) any parol
evidence tending to show corporate liability on the note was inadmissible. 116
The court of appeals rejected these contentions on the ground that the credi-
tor had not brought suit on the note given by the corporate president, but
had sued on the underlying obligation.' 17 The court then held that the as-
serted defenses did not apply to the suit as brought. 1 8 Furthermore, deliv-
ery of the note by the third party corporate president did not constitute
payment or release of the pre-existing debt in the absence of an express
agreement to this effect by the parties. 119 The court further ruled that the
four year period of limitations applied since the loan was payable less than
two years prior to the 1979 amendment that made the four year statute' 20
rather than the two year statute 12 1 applicable to oral loans. Since the limita-
tion period had not run prior to the amendment extending the time to sue,
the defendant did not have a vested right to resist the claim. 122
112. The court pointed to the fact that Badger had two notes with different terms, neither
of which was signed by the partnership nor by the other partner. The court also noted that
Badger was aware of the partnership and that the funds would be used for partnership pur-
poses, and yet Badger still accepted individual notes from the parties. 693 S.W.2d at 647.
113. Id. at 647-48.
114. 687 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
115. Id. at 459 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.401 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)).
116. 687 S.W.2d at 459.
117. Id. The defendant relied upon First State Bank v. Dyer, 151 Tex. 650, 254 S.W.2d 92
(1953), as did the defendant in Anderson v. Badger, 693 S.W.2d at 646. However, unlike
Badger and Dyer, the debt in this case predated the note, thereby giving it an identity separate
and apart from the note.
118. 687 S.W.2d at 459.
119. Id.
120. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5527 (Vernon 1971).
121. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526 (1925), amended by Act of June 13, 1979, ch.
716, § 1, 1979 Tex. Gen. Laws 1768.
122. 687 S.W.2d at 459. In Raley v. Wichita County, 72 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1934, opinion adopted), it was held that "the statute of limitations in force at the time the
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Retamco, Inc. v. Dixilyn-Field Drilling Co. 123 involved the liability of one
who signed a note twice, once as agent of a corporation and once in his
individual capacity,124 when the note itself referred only to the corporation
as the "maker." 125 The defendant signatory argued that the note only obli-
gated the party that was identified as "maker," the corporation, and that he
was acting merely as the agent for a disclosed principal and thus had no
individual liability. The court rejected this argument and held that under
Texas law 126 each person who signs a note as a maker is jointly and severally
liable unless the instrument specifies otherwise. 127 Since the note did not so
specify, the defendant was individually liable unless he established that he
had signed the note in another capacity. The court held that proof that a
note has been signed in a different capacity is an affirmative defense. 128
Since the defendant neither pleaded nor offered any proof of this affirmative
defense in accordance with rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 29
summary judgment for the note holder was proper. 130
An attempt to assert the contractual defense of no consideration to avoid
liability under a note failed in two relatively straightforward cases. In Salt
Water Resources v. Kirkpatrick & O'Donnell Construction Equipment Co. 13
the court found that evidence of a pre-existing debt was sufficient considera-
tion to support the note. In Broaddus v. First State Bank 32 a bank depos-
ited loan proceeds directly to the account of an individual who sold cattle to
the borrower. A third party holding a security interest eventually foreclosed
on the cattle. The jury accepted the borrower's argument that he had re-
ceived no consideration for his promise to repay the loan. The court of ap-
peals affirmed the action of the trial court in disregarding this special issue
because the issue defined consideration to mean either a benefit to the bor-
rower or a detriment to the bank. 133 The bank clearly suffered a detriment
suit is brought or at least when the case is tried determines the right of a party to sue for a
claim."
123. 693 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
124. The note was signed:
Retamco, Inc.
By Steve Gose (signed)
Steve Gose (signed)
Individually-Steve Gose
125. The heading of the note designated only the corporation as "maker". The note also
contained provisions that: "Each maker is responsible for the entire amount of this note," and
"the terms Maker and Payee and other nouns and pronouns include the plural if more than
one". Id. at 521.
126. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.118(5) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) provides: "Un-
less the instrument otherwise specifies two or more persons who sign as maker, acceptor, or
drawer or indorser and as part of the same transaction are jointly and severally liable even
though the instrument contains words such as 'I promise to pay'."
127. 693 S.W.2d at 521.
128. Id. at 521 (following Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251, 254 (Tex. 1974)).
129. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
130. 693 S.W.2d at 521.
131. 694 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
132. 681 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
133. Id. at 882. The courts have settled that consideration may be a detriment to the
promisee as well as a benefit to the promisor. Texas Export Dev. Corp. v. Schleder, 519
S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
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when it advanced the funds. 134
In Williamson v. Dunlap135 the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule
that a demand for payment must precede a valid acceleration of a note; the
notice of acceleration cannot be given contemporaneously with the demand
for payment. 136 Nevertheless, even if the acceleration may be invalid, the
creditor is entitled to recover past due installments plus interest. 137 The
right to accelerate payments under a loan was also an issue in Estate of Kai-
ser v. Gifford. 138 That case involved the classic transaction between an uncle
and his nephew-a staple in law school contract classes for years. The uncle
paid approximately $17,000 for a house and furnishings for his nephew.
Although the two had not signed a written agreement, the nephew made
forty-four monthly payments totaling $6,685.14 until the uncle's death. De-
spite the nephew's protestation that the money was a gift, the court of ap-
peals sustained the trial court finding that the uncle and nephew had
intended the money to be a loan to be repaid in 300 monthly installments. 139
The court held that the uncle's estate was entitled to accelerate the amount
due because the nephew's repudiation of the loan agreement constituted an
anticipatory breach. 140 The court further held that the statute of frauds14 1
did not bar recovery, even though the agreement could not be performed in
one year, under the general rule that full performance by one party and ac-
ceptance of benefits by the other renders the statute inapplicable. 142
In Crimmins v. Lowry143 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a comaker of a promissory note may claim the defense of impair-
ment of collateral. In 1977 two law partners, Lowry and McNiel, executed
on behalf of the partnership a promissory note in the amount of $11,000
payable to Crimmins. Crimmins received a security interest in the office
equipment and furniture; however, he did not file the financing statement
until August, 1980, two years after the partnership had been dissolved.
Shortly thereafter, McNiel filed for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court
declared the security interest void as a preferential transfer.
Crimmins sued Lowry on the note, and Lowry defended by asserting that
Crimmins had discharged him pursuant to section 3.606(a)(2) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code' 44 when he impaired the collateral of the note by the
late filing. After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the pro-
134. 681 S.W.2d at 882.
135. 693 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1985).
136. Id. at 374.
137. Id.
138. 692 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
139. Id. at 527-528.
140. Id.
141. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 1985).
142. 692 S.W.2d at 526-27. The court also relied upon the fact that "there were 42 sepa-
rate written instruments evidencing an agreement that a monthly installment of a fixed amount
was payable to [the uncle] in satisfaction of the debt." Id. at 527.
143. 691 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. 1985).
144. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.606(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). That sec-
tion provides: "(a) The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extent that with-
out such party's consent the holder. . . (2) Unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the
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vision, 145 the Texas Supreme Court held that the words "any party" in sec-
tion 3.606(a) were intended to include all parties in the position of a surety
or all parties with a right of recourse. The court opined that a comaker is a
surety because he has a potential right of recourse against his comaker for
the excess of his pro-rata share. 146 A comaker is, therefore, entitled to claim
the suretyship defenses of section 3.606, including a right to discharge, to the
extent of his recourse for unjustifiable impairment of collateral. 147 In this
particular case Lowry was entitled upon proper proof to a discharge for the
part of the debt for which he was a surety, that is, for up to one-half of the
claim. 148 In a concurring opinion three members of the court pointed out
that had Lowry proven that he was a mere accommodation party, 49 he
would have been entitled to a full discharge pursuant to section
3.606(a)(2). 150
The amount of attorneys' fees recoverable under a stipulation in a promis-
sory note was at issue in Long v. Tascosa National Bank ofAmarillo.15' The
note provided that "in the event default is made... [and] suit is brought on
same.. .then the makers agree and promise to pay ten percent (10%) addi-
tional on the amount of principal and interest then owing, as attorneys'
fees." The jury found reasonable attorneys' fees to be $3,500.00; however,
the trial court disregarded their answer and awarded $40,465.82, represent-
ing ten percent of the balance due at the time suit was filed. The court of
appeals rebuffed the defendant's argument that the creditor had waived re-
covery of attorneys' fees in excess of the jury finding, holding that the note
language entitled the holder to recover the attorneys' fees as stipulated un-
less the obligor pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense that the con-
tractual fee was unreasonable and a lesser amount was reasonable. 152 In the
absence of such a defensive issue, the noteholder was not required to prove
an agreement to pay the stipulated fee to an attorney or even that the stipu-
lated fee was reasonable. 153
instrument given by or on behalf of the party or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse." Id.
145. 691 S.W.2d at 584.
146. Id.
147. Id. In so holding, the court disapproved of the opinions in Pan Am. Bank v. Nowl-
and, 650 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.) and Hooper v. Ryan,
581 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, no writ) to the extent that they conflicted with
the opinion of the court.
148. 691 S.W.2d at 585. The court held that since the defenses in § 3.606 are affirmative
defenses, Lowry had the burden of proving the amount remaining on the debt (which was less
than one-half of the original debt) for which he was a surety. Unable to prove this, Lowry
failed to carry his burden. Id. at 585-86.
149. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.415 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) defines an accom-
modation party as "one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the purpose of lending his
name to another party to it."
150. 691 S.W.2d at 586.
151. 678 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ).
152. Id. at 706. The court stated in dicta that it was not incorrect to calculate the attor-
neys' fees based upon the amount due at the time suit was filed rather than the time of judg-
ment. Id.
153. 678 S.W.2d at 706.
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In Preston State Bank v. Jordan- 4 the court held that a creditor bank had
failed to establish its right to summary judgment in a bank credit card case
when the bank failed to prove the terms and conditions of the contract. The
failure of the debtor to deny, pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
93(7), 155 that a contract was executed did not relieve the bank of its burden
to prove the terms of the contract. Perhaps more noteworthy than the hold-
ing of the court was its discussion of bank credit card agreements. 156
The proper rate of prejudgment and postjudgment interest was at issue in
Clark v. Walker-Kurth Lumber Co. 157 The credit agreement between the
parties contained a promise by the debtor to pay interest at the full legal rate
on any delinquent amount. The debtor argued that article 1.03,158 which
specified a rate of six percent per annum when the parties had not agreed
upon a specific rate of interest, controlled. The court of appeals held, how-
ever, that the phrase "full legal rate" indicated an intent to permit the maxi-
mum allowable prejudgment interest under the law, which at the time of the
agreement was ten percent. 159 Since the parties intended a rate of interest
equal to ten percent, the creditor was also entitled to this rate of post-judg-
ment interest pursuant to article 1.05.160
In Spillman v. Self-Serv Fixture Co.16 1 the Dallas court of appeals con-
fronted the issue of whether a creditor had met its burden of explaining an
alteration of an instrument upon which the suit was based. The creditor had
brought suit upon a guaranty agreement that contained the words "up to
$20,000" typed over a whited-out portion of the document. The guarantor
contended that the creditor made the alteration without his authorization or
knowledge for the purpose of increasing the amount of his guaranty beyond
$5,000. The majority held that testimony by the creditor that the instrument
was in the same condition as when received from the maker was sufficient
explanation to authorize the instruments introduction into evidence.162 The
dissent strongly argued that a simple denial of responsibility for the altera-
tion did not constitute an adequate explanation of the alteration. 63 In the
dissent's view, the rule adopted by the majority would encourage fraud by
154. 692 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93(7).
156. 692 S.W.2d at 744. The court described the "bank credit card" as a three part agree-
ment between the bank, the merchant, and the consumer. The court distinguished it from the
two party credit card agreements, such as department store credit cards. Although the court
acknowledged differences, it compared a bank credit card arrangement to a letter of credit.
692 S.W.2d at 742.
157. 689 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
158. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971).
159. 689 S.W.2d at 282. The court distinguished Jetty, Inc. v. Hall-McGuff Architects,
595 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ), in which the court held
that TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1971) controlled, because in Jetty the
contract provided for the legal rate of interest rather than the full legal rate of interest agreed
upon in this case.
160. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon 1971).
161. 693 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
162. Id. at 657-58.
163. Id. at 659.
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permitting unscrupulous creditors to alter instruments and deny responsibil-
ity, secure in the knowledge that the altered instrument would be admissible.
B. Guaranty Agreements
A guaranty agreement, as a type of indemnity contract, must be supported
by consideration to be enforceable. 164 When a party gives the guaranty con-
temporaneously with the promise of the primary debtor, the consideration
that supports the primary obligation supports the guaranty agreement. 165
When parties enter into the guaranty agreement independently of the pri-
mary transaction, however, consideration distinct from that of the primary
debt must support the guaranty.' 66 A guaranty that covers future indebted-
ness that was not previously contracted for by the parties supplies the neces-
sary independent consideration. 167
When the guaranty agreement contains a promise to pay any obligation of
the debtor, the guarantor cannot rely upon the credit limitations initially
imposed by the creditor upon the debtor to protect the guarantor from liabil-
ity in excess of the credit limitation, according to Clark v. Walker-Kurth
Lumber Co.' 68 The guaranty in that case provided in part that the guaran-
tor personally guaranteed payment of all the debtor's obligations. 69 The
guarantor submitted the guaranty with a credit application to the creditor,
who later noted on the application "OK $1000 limit".' 70 On appeal the
guarantor argued that it was not liable over the amount of $1000 and that
the creditor breached the credit agreement by allowing purchases in excess
of the credit limit. The court, although acknowledging the rule of strictis-
simijuris,'7 ' held that construing the guaranty agreement as limiting liabil-
ity to the credit limit would be unreasonable due to the absence of any
evidence indicating that the guarantor requested, intended, or expected this
limitation. Furthermore, the language of the guaranty clearly provided to
the contrary. The court distinguished between limits on credit and limits on
liability, holding that a credit limitation is not a condition of the contract
when the guarantor agrees to guarantee payment of all credit extended to the
debtor. ' 72
In Bullock v. Kehoe173 the guarantors of a note sought to avoid liability on
the ground that the note, which was executed after the guaranty agreements,
was payable at the expiration of five years whereas the guaranty recited a
164. Fourticq v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no
writ).
165. Id. at 564.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 565.
168. 689 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
169. Id. at 277.
170. Id. at 277.
171. This rule requires an agreement to be strictly construed and not extended beyond its
precise terms by construction or implication. Id. at 278; Reece v. First State Bank, 566 S.W.2d
296, 297 (Tex. 1978).
172. 689 S.W.2d at 279.
173. 678 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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payment date of six years. The court acknowledged the well-established rule
that a material variance in the terms of the primary obligation serves to
discharge the guarantor. 174 The court, however, held that the guarantors
failed to carry their burden of proving that the difference in the due dates
caused them injury or enhanced their risk and noted that the default oc-
curred before the date of maturity under written document.175
In Allied Supplier & Erection v. A. Baldwin & Co. 176 the court reaffirmed
the rule that a guarantor may not bring a claim or interpose a defense based
upon usury that was committed in the course of the primary transaction.177
C. Liens
Priority between lienholders was at issue in Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v.
Frigiking.178 In that case both of the named parties extended credit to a
debtor and held security interests in the debtor's inventory and proceeds.
Frigiking gave and perfected its security interest prior to the security interest
of Dallas Bank & Trust Co. Thereafter, the debtor filed for relief under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Both prior to and after filing, the
debtor made substantial payments to the bank. The debtor ultimately con-
verted the bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 7, and the existing inventory
was liquidated. At issue on appeal was whether Frigiking or the bank held a
superior interest in: (1) the funds paid to the bank prior to and after the
filing in Bankruptcy Court, and (2) the proceeds of the liquidated inven-
tory. 179 With regard to the former, the court held that the bank had ac-
cepted payments from the debtor for value,' 80 in good faith, 18' and without
notice that any check that it had received was overdue, had been dishonored,
or was subject to any claim or defense. 182 Accordingly, the bank was a
holder in due course, 183 which entitled it to priority over Frigiking's prior
security interest. The court stated that neither Frigiking's filing of the fi-
nancing statement, filing for bankruptcy, nor payments as a debtor-in-pos-
session were notice of a claim sufficient to destroy the bank's holder in due
174. Id. at 559.
175. 678 S.W.2d at 559-60.
176. 688 S.W.2d 156 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ).
177. Id. at 160.
178. 692 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
179. The bank challenged the jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate the parties' interests in
the funds, contending that the bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction. The court noted
that the bankruptcy court had abstained from hearing this proceeding and remanded the mat-
ter back to state court. The court held that the determination of priorities between secured
parties is determined by state law and not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court. 692 S.W.2d at 163-65.
180. Id. at 166. The bank took the checks as payment for an antecedent claim and thus
took them for value. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.303(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
181. 692 S.W.2d at 166. Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned". TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.021 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
182. 692 S.W.2d at 166.
183. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1985). Section
3.301(a) provides: "A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument (1) for value;
and (2) in good faith; and (3) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or any
defenses against or claim to it on the part of any person."
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course status; notice of a claim means a claim against a specific instrument
and not simply the insolvency of the maker.184 With regard to the proceeds
of the liquidated inventory in possession of the bankruptcy trustee, the bank
was not a holder, and Frigiking's general security interest in the proceeds
took priority over the subsequently filed security interest of the bank. 185
In Ford Motor Credit Company v. First State Bank'18 6 the Texas Supreme
Court applied the provisions of section 9.312187 of the Uniform Commercial
Code to determine the priority between the holder of a purchase money se-
curity interest in inventory and the holder of a previously filed financing
statement in the same collateral. The court held that section 9.312 creates
an exception to the rule that gives priority to the creditor who is first to file a
financing statement: 8 8 a holder of a purchase money security interest will
have priority if he gives notice of his interest to the creditor, 18 9 which is
required by section 9.312.190 The court held that since the bank had failed to
give notice of its purchase money security interest to Ford Motor Credit, the
general priority rule controlled, and Ford's prior filed financing statement
was superior. 191
In Barr v. White Oak State Bank 192 the court held that a financing state-
184. 692 S.W.2d at 166.
185. Id. at 166-67.
186. 679 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1984).
187. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986) provides in
pertinent part:
(c) A perfected purchase money security interest in inventory has priority over
a conflicting security interest in the same inventory and also has priority in iden-
tifiable cash proceeds received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a
buyer if
(1) the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor
receives possession of the inventory; and ....
(2) the purchase money secured party gives notification in writing to the
holder of the conflicting security interest if the holder had filed a financing
statement covering the same types of inventory (i) before the date of the filing
made by the purchase money secured party.. .and
(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives any required notifi-
cation within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory;
and
(4) the notification states that the person giving the notice has or expects to
acquire a purchase money security interest in inventory of the debtor, describ-
ing such inventory by item or type.
(e) In all cases not governed by other rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in Subsections (c) and (d) of this section), priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined according
to the following rules:
(1) Conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of filing
or perfection. Priority dates from the time a filing is first made covering the
collateral or the time the security interest is first perfected, whichever is ear-
lier, provided that there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor
perfection.
188. Id. § 9.312(e)(1).
189. 679 S.W.2d at 487.
190. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(c)(2), (3), (4) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp.
1986).
191. 679 S.W.2d at 487.
192. 677 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
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ment filed on collateral does not secure the creditor for a new loan to the
purchaser of the collateral when the original note was paid and the creditor
approved the transfer of collateral.
The question before the Texas Supreme Court in RepublicBank Dallas v.
Interkal, Inc.19 3 was whether a bank's security interest in the accounts re-
ceivable of a contractor was subordinate to a materialman's rights to those
receivables under article 5472e. 194 That statute impresses a trust upon all
funds paid to a contractor for improvements to specific realty for the benefit
of those who furnish labor or materials for the improvement. The court of
appeals, with one justice dissenting, had held that section 4 of the statute
exempts banks and savings and loans only from criminal prosecution for
receipt or disbursement of trust fund monies, not from the trust fund provi-
sions of the statute. 195 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the plain
language of the statute exempted lenders from coverage, and thus article
5472e did not defeat the bank's priority as a secured creditor of the funds. 196
In Mercer v. Daoran Corp.197 the Texas Supreme Court held that a junior
lienholder will not advance in priority upon the failure of a senior lienholder
to record a valid contract that renews and extends the senior lien' 9 8 if the
193. 691 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1985).
194. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5472e provides in part as follows:
Section 1. All moneys or funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor or any
officer, director or agent thereof, under a construction contract for the improve-
ment of specific real property in this state, and all funds borrowed by a contrac-
tor, subcontractor, owner, or any officer, director or agent thereof, for the
purpose of improving such real property which are secured in whole or in part
by a lien on the specific property to be improved are hereby declared to be Trust
Funds for the benefit of the artisans, laborers, mechanics, contractors or materi-
almen who may labor or furnish labor or material for the construction or repair
of any house, building or improvement whatever upon such real property; pro-
vided, however, that moneys paid to a contractor or subcontractor or borrowed
by a contractor, subcontractor, or owner may be used to pay reasonable over-
head of said contractor, subcontractor or owner, directly related to such con-
struction contract. The contractor, subcontractor, owner, or any officer,
director or agent thereof, receiving such payments or funds or having control or
direction of same, is hereby made and constituted a Trustee of such funds so
received or under his control or direction.
Section 4. This Act shall have no application to any bank, savings and loan
association or other lender or in any title company or other closing agent in
connection with any transaction to which this Act is applicable. Further, mon-
eys or funds received under a construction contract are exempt from the provi-
sions of this Act if the full contract amount is covered by a corporate surety
payment bond.
Id. art. 5472e (repealed 1983, reenacted in TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-004 (1984)).
The court noted that article 5472e was in effect at the time of the events in this case and
therefore was controlling. 691 S.W.2d at 607 n.l.
195. RepublicBank Dallas v. Interkal, Inc., 677 S.W.2d 759, 761-62 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1984, rev'd sub nom, 691 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1985)). The court of appeals' opinion conflicted
with Heldenfels Bros. v. First Nat'l Bank, 657 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
196. 691 S.W.2d at 607-08.
197. 676 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. 1984).
198. Unless the lien is renewed and extended, it is barred after four years from the date a
cause of action for foreclosure of the lien accrued. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5520
(Vernon 1958) (repealed 1985, reenacted in CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.035 (Vernon Supp.
1986)).
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junior lienholder acquires his lien at a time when the senior lien is not barred
of record.' 99 Under these circumstances, an unrecorded valid extension is
binding upon a junior lienholder. 200 If the junior lienholder acquires his lien
when the debt that secures the first lien appears of record to be barred, how-
ever, he is not bound by an unrecorded extension agreement between the
debtor and the first lienholder.
20 1
In Churchill v. R ussey 2 0 2 the creditor obtained a judgment in 1970 against
the debtor. Although execution on the judgment did not issue within ten
years of the date of the judgment, as required by article 3773203 to prevent
the judgment from becoming dormant, the creditor filed an action to fore-
close the judgment lien in 1979. The trial court ordered a sheriffs sale of
certain real property owned by the debtor. The creditor bought the property
at the sale subject to an outstanding vendor's lien. In an attempt to recover
the property, the debtor's attorney purchased the vendor's lien and, after
rejecting offers of the creditor to pay the full amount of the vendor's lien
note, posted the property for foreclosure. The creditor then filed this suit
enjoining the sale and payed into the registry sufficient funds to pay off the
note plus interest. On appeal the court of appeals held that the creditor's
suit to foreclose the judgment lien was an action of debt sufficient to revive
the dormant judgment pursuant to article 5532.204 The court rejected the
argument by the owner of the first lien that the creditor was not entitled to
redeem the vendor's lien note by paying the balance plus interest without
also paying attorneys' fees and costs of collection. 20 5 The court held that by
tendering the balance of the note plus interest, the creditor stopped the ac-
crual of interest and precluded the lienholder from recovering attorneys' fees
and costs.
2 °6
199. 676 S.W.2d at 582.
200. Id.
201. Id. A renewal and extension may not prejudice the rights of lienholders or purchasers
subsequent who acquire their interests after the lien becomes barred of record. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5520 and 5522 (Vernon 1958) (repealed 1985, reenacted in Civ. PRAC.
& REM. CODE §§ 16.035-.037 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).
202. 692 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
203. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3773 (Vernon 1966) provided:
If no execution is issued within ten years after the rendition of a judgment in any
court of record, the judgment shall become dormant and no execution shall is-
sue thereon unless such judgment be revived. If the first execution has issued
within the ten years, the judgment shall not become dormant, unless ten years
shall have elapsed between the issuance of executions thereon, and execution
may issue at any time within ten years after the issuance of the preceding execu-
tion. Id. (repealed 1985, reenacted in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 34.001
(Vernon Supp. 1986)).
204. 692 S.W.2d at 598. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5532 (Vernon 1958) provided
that "[a] judgment in any court of record, where execution has not issued within twelve
months after the rendition of the judgment, may be revived by scire facias or an action of debt
brought thereon within ten years after date of such judgment, and not after." Id. (repealed
1985, reenacted in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.006 (Vernon Supp. 1986)).




D. Execution on Judgments
At issue in Rome Industries v. Intsel Southwest 20 7 was the right of a credi-
tor of a business that had been sold pursuant to the Bulk Transfers Act 20 8 to
garnish a portion of the funds held by the transferee of the business for dis-
tribution to the creditors of the transferor. The issue arose when the debtor
business sold substantially all of its assets, in a bulk transfer, 20 9 to a buyer
for a sum of money that was insufficient to pay all of the claims of the trans-
feror. Under the terms of the purchase agreement, the parties placed the
purchase money in escrow for distribution to creditors as required by section
6.106 of the Bulk Transfer Act.210 After receiving notification of the sale, a
creditor of the transferor served writs of garnishment on the escrow agent
and the transferee. The trial court granted the creditor judgment in the
amount of its debt, which exceeded its pro-rata share of the sale proceeds.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that
when the requirements of the bulk transfer provisions have been met, a cred-
itor may not cut off the rights of the other creditors by serving a writ of
garnishment. 211 The court reasoned that a garnishor stands in the shoes of
the debtor and may only enforce those rights that the debtor may enforce
against the garnishee. 212 The debtor had no right to payment because the
Bulk Transfer Act requires the new consideration for the transfer to be paid
to the creditors of the transferor on a pro-rata basis.213
A garnishee holding funds that are exempt from garnishment, such as
wages has a duty to raise that defense to the writ of garnishment. 21 4 In
Southwest Bank & Trust Co. v. Calmark Asset Management2 5 the court ap-
plied this rule both to trust funds and to funds that are not owned by the
debtor but are deposited with a garnishee bank in the name of the debtor.216
The court further held that the duty of a garnishee is not discharged by
merely notifying the debtor of the garnishment action. 217
207. 683 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
208. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §§ 6.101-6.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
209. A bulk transfer is defined as "any transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course of
the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inven-
tory (Section 9.109) of an enterprise subject to this chapter." Id. § 6.102(a).
210. Section 6.106 provides in part:
(1) upon every bulk transfer. . .for which new consideration becomes paya-
ble... it is the duty of the transferee to assure that such consideration is applied
so far as necessary to pay those debts of the transferor.
(3) If the consideration payable is not enough to pay all of said debts in full
distribution shall be made pro-rata.
Id. § 6.106.
211. 683 S.W.2d at 780. In dicta the court stated that when the Act has not been complied
with "creditors may ignore the transfer and pursue whatever remedies would be available to
them under state laws outside the code." Id. at 779.
212. Id. at 779.
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
214. See Missouri Pac. Ky. Co. v. Whipker, 77 Tex. 14, 13 S.W. 639 (1890).
215. 694 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
216. Id. at 200.
217. Id. at 201. In this case, the debtor did not intervene until after the garnishee had paid
the funds pursuant to the garnishment judgment. Good practice counsels impleading the
debtor so that the debtor can make its own defense.
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In Matter ofBohart218 the Fifth Circuit interpreted Texas law to hold that
a writ of garnishment that is issued pursuant to a trial court judgment that is
not superseded becomes ineffective upon reversal of the trial court judgment
by the court of appeals, despite the fact that the trial court judgment is later
affirmed by the Texas Supreme Court. 219 Thus, payments made by the gar-
nishee to persons other than the garnishor during the period between the
judgments of the court of appeals and the supreme court do not violate the
writ of garnishment. 220
The constitutionality of the Texas sequestration statute and the adequacy
of the affidavit supporting issuance of the writ were at issue in Marrs v. South
Texas National Bank.221 Marrs contended that the bank's affidavit failed to
include any facts to support the conclusion that the defendant would conceal
or remove the property in question. Although the affidavit is not quoted in
the opinion, the court held that when an affidavit discusses the plaintiff's
fears that the defendant will conceal, dispose of, destroy, or remove property
from the jurisdiction of the court, then it complies with the statutory re-
quirement. 222 The court further held that the statute, as amended in 1975,
met the due process requirements of the Constitution.223 The court's hold-
ing concerning the affidavit appears to be inconsistent with the spirit, if not
the letter, of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 696, which requires the affiant to
allege the specific facts that plaintiff relied upon in order to warrant the
court's required findings. 224 Ironically, the post-1975 requirement of speci-
ficity has been listed as one of the bases for the constitutionality of the se-
questration statute.225
In Concrete, Inc. v. Sprayberry226 the court held that for the purpose of
notice of the sale of real estate under execution, the day of posting is prop-
erly counted as the first day. Rule 4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 227 which excludes the first day and includes the last day, does not
control.228
E. Exempt Property
In Hillock Homes v. Claflin229 (In re Claflin) the Fifth Circuit considered
the objection of a creditor to the homestead rights of a Chapter 11 debtor.
The debtor, a divorcee, had established a homestead with her minor children
in a Houston townhome. Approximately three years later she moved to
Austin, remarried, and lived with her children and new husband in a home
218. 743 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1984).
219. Id. at 323.
220. Id. at 324.
221. 686 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
222. Id. at 677-78.
223. Id. at 678.
224. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696.
225. BAGGET, TEXAS FORECLOSURE LAW & PRACTICE § 8.04 (1984).
226. 691 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
227. TEX. R. Civ. P. 4.
228. 691 S.W.2d at 772.
229. 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985).
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that he claimed as his homestead. In March of 1982 a creditor obtained a
judgment against the debtor. In June the debtor and her family moved to
rental property, although her husband still owned the Austin property. In
July of that year, the debtor filed for bankruptcy and claimed her Houston
townhome as homestead. The Fifth Circuit overturned the bankruptcy
court determination that the Houston property was the homestead of the
debtor and her family.230 The court, relying upon Burke Royalty v. Riley,2 3 1
held that when the debtor remarried she lost her homestead claim as a single
adult and could claim only the homestead of her new family.232 The court
found no evidence that the debtor's new family had established the Houston
property as their homestead. Substantial evidence existed to show that they
had designated the Austin property as their homestead by their actual use
and occupancy of it.233
In United States v. Chapman2 34 the Fifth Circuit rebuffed the attempt of a
taxpayer who had fraudulently conveyed real property to his children in an
attempt to avoid a tax lien to claim a homestead right in the conveyed prop-
erty. The court rested its holding on the testimony of the taxpayer that she
and her husband were renting the property from their children.23 5 The court
noted that, except with respect to the defrauded creditors, Texas law does
not appear to support a homestead claim by a grantor who fraudulently con-
veys property to avoid creditors, since the grantee holds title.236
F. Constructive Trust
The rights of a beneficiary of a constructive trust versus the rights of a
trustee in bankruptcy were considered in Vineyard v. McKenzie.237 In Vine-
yard the Fifth Circuit held that when state law imposes a constructive trust
on property that is held by the debtor and the trust attaches prior to the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the trust beneficiary may reclaim its eq-
uitable interest from the trustee.238 One other than the beneficiary, who
merely claims an interest in the estate property subjected to a constructive
trust, however, gains no additional rights and must yield to the strong-arm
powers of the trustee.239
G. Foreign Judgments
In Allen v. Tennant240 the court held that failure to follow the procedures
230. Id. at 1093.
231. 475 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1972).
232. 761 F.2d at 1090 (quoting the Texas Supreme Court in Burke Royalty v. Riley, 475
S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1972): "after the new family was created by her remarriage, there was
no homestead apart from that new family").
233. 761 F.2d at 1091.
234. 756 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1985).
235. Id. at 1243.
236. Id. at 1243-44 (citing Stevens v. Cobern, 213 S.W. 925, 926 (Tex. 1919)).
237. 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985).
238. Id. at 1012.
239. Id. at 1014-15.
240. 678 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
[Vol. 40
CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
set forth in the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 24' prevents
a Texas court from obtaining jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. 242
III. WRONGFUL DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY
A. Fraudulent Transfers
In Colonial Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group International24 3 the
court held that a creditor with a pending legal action against a debtor may
seek relief under the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act244 even though his
claim is unliquidated at the time of the alleged fraudulent transfer, provided
the creditor's claim accrued prior to the transfer.245 Before relief is granted
pursuant to the Act, however, the creditor must prove recovery of a judg-
ment against the debtor.24 6 Although the judgment is conclusive against the
transferor, it constitutes merely prima facie evidence of the underlying debt
as to the transferee, who may rebut it with evidence that it is a fraudulent or
collusive judgment. 247
United States v. Chapman248 involved an attempt by a creditor whose debt
arose after the creation of the suspect transfer to set aside a conveyance
under the Texas Fraudulent Transfer Act. The court held that when a debt
arises after the transfer, rather than prior to the transfer as in the Colonial
Leasing249 case, the creditor must show that the debtor made the transfer
with the intent at the time of the transfer to evade future liabilities to that
creditor. 250
B. Wrongful Disposition of Collateral
In First City Bank-Farmers Branch v. Guez25 1 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed the question of what constitutes a disposition of collateral under
section 9.504252 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The bank in that case
had transferred possession of the repossessed collateral, a boat, to a friend of
the consumer in exchange for past due payments and a note for the unpaid
balance. The bank did not notify the consumer of the transfer. The bank
then reversed itself, voided the note, and accepted full payment from the
original consumer. By the time the consumer had recovered the boat from
the friend, it had been damaged. The consumer alleged that the bank had
disposed of the boat without notice to him in violation of section 9.504(c).253
241. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
242. 678 S.W.2d at 744.
243. 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985), aff'd on rehearing, 770 F.2d 479 (1985).
244. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 24.02(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
245. 762 F.2d at 458.
246. Id. at 458.
247. Id. at 460.
248. 756 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1985).
249. 762 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1985).
250. 756 F.2d at 1240-41.
251. 677 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. 1984).
252. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
253. Section 9.504(c) provides in pertinent part that "[d]isposition of the collateral may be
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The supreme court agreed and held that even though title to the boat never
passed to the friend, a disposition of collateral had occurred. 254 The
supreme court further held that the consumer is entitled to recover either his
actual damages from the wrongful disposition or the minimum damages
under the statutory formula set forth in section 9.507(a), 255 but not both. 256
Finally, the court held that although attorneys' fees are not recoverable pur-
suant to section 9.507(a), attorneys' fees are allowable under article 2226.257
In Barr v. White Oak State Bank 258 the court held that a bank that fore-
closed on its security interest in collateral without giving notice to the hold-
ers of a prior perfected security interest violated section 9.504 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.259 Significantly, the court further held that evi-
dence that the bank officer failed to perform a lien check with the Secretary
of State's Office despite his knowledge that such a check would determine
other creditors that might be entitled to notification was sufficient to raise an
issue as to the bank's liability for exemplary damages.2 60
C. Attachment, Lis Pendens
In Milberg Factors v. Hurwitz-Nordlicht26 1 the court held that joint ven-
ture assets are not subject to attachment or execution by a joint venturer's
individual creditors. The court reasoned that a joint venture is a separate
legal entity; the property of the joint venture is not property of the individual
joint ventures since it is subject to a mutual right of control of the joint
venturers. The court further held that since the creditor's suit was for col-
lection of a debt that did not directly involve real property, a lis pendens
notice was not authorized and was properly dissolved by the trial court.262
D. Bulk Sales
In SVM Investments v. Mexican Exporters, Inc.2 63 the court construed the
limitations provision in section 6.111 of the Bulk Transfers Act,26 4 which
bars actions under the Bulk Transfers Act after six months from the transfer
unless the transfer was concealed. The court held that concealment under
the Act occurs when the record discloses affirmative efforts to conceal the
transfer and when the defendant has completely failed to comply with the
notice provisions of the statute. 265 The court held that when informal notice
by public or private proceedings..." and "reasonable notification of the.. sale... shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor." Id. § 9.504(c).
254. 677 S.W.2d at 28.
255. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
256. 677 S.W.2d at 29-30.
257. Id.
258. 677 S.W.2d 707, 710-11 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no writ).
259. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
260. 677 S.W.2d at 711.
261. 676 S.W.2d 613, 616 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
262. Id.
263. 685 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
264. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.101-6.111 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
265. 685 S.W.2d at 430.
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has been given so that actual knowledge is received, the mere failure to give
the written notice does not constitute concealment.
266
In Bergen, Johnson and Olson v. Verco Manufacturing Co. 2 6 7 the court
held that a creditor that seeks to invoke the provisions of the Bulk Transfer
Act carries the burden of proving that the transfer by the debtor was a bulk
transfer 268 within the meaning of the Act. Since the creditor brought for-
ward no proof as to what percentage of the debtor's inventory was trans-
ferred, he had not discharged his burden of proving that a major part of the
inventory of the debtor had been transferred as required by the Act.
2 69
In Hanson v. Pride of Texas Distributing Co.2 7 0 the court considered sec-
tion 6.103(3) of the Bulk Transfers Act, which exempts from the Act
"[t]ransfers in settlement or realization of a lien or other security inter-
est."' 27 1 The court held that the exemptions contained in section 6.103 are
not affirmative defenses governed by the pleading requirements of Rule 94 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.272 The court further held that in order
for a transfer to be exempt under section 6.103(3), the evidence must show
not only a lien or security interest but also that the transferor has defaulted
on its obligation, thereby giving the secured party a present right to foreclose
on the lien or security interest.
27 3
266. Id.
267. 690 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, no writ).
268. A bulk transfer is defined to include "a transfer in bulk and not in the ordinary course
of the transferor's business of a major part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other
inventory (Section 9.109) of an enterprise subject to this chapter." TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE
ANN. § 6.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
269. 690 S.W.2d at 119.
270. 683 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
271. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 6.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
272. 683 S.W.2d at 178.
273. Id. This holding appears to be one of first impression under Texas law, and the court
treated it as such.
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